Abstract
of reliable dose-response models (Buse et al. 2012 ) and therefore the difficulty to define 76 an acceptable level of Lp contamination that would minimize risk. While the level of 77 positivity for Legionella in health care facilities (HCF) HWDS has been proposed as a 78 reliable predictive risk factor (Best et al. 1983 , Lin et al. 2011 , the specificity and 79 sensitivity of the 30% positivity cut-off point has been recently questioned (Allen et al. 80 heater outlet, return loops and sentinel taps. Sentinel taps include representative at-131 risk taps as well as the first and last taps of each return loops. The use of continuous 132 temperature monitoring is recommended for the water heater outlets and the return 133 loops. In addition, temperature at the tap should be monitored annually on a rotating 134 basis covering 20% of taps yearly, to ensure the whole system is meeting required 135 temperatures for Legionella control. It is not permissible to shut down pumped 136 recirculation as it would lead to the loss of the required system temperatures. 137
Legionella monitoring is not prescribed unless target temperatures cannot be achieved; 138 however it is recommended in areas with highly vulnerable patients. Weekly flushing for 139 several minutes is recommended for low usage taps. Henriques 1947). Some countries specify maximum temperatures at the point-of-use to 160 avoid scalding (Table S1 ), but newly updated regulation in United Kingdom require a risk 161 assessment comparison between the risk of scalding and the risk of infection before 162 limiting the hot water temperature below 50°C, a risk factor for Legionella proliferation. 163
164
Although the critical elements of temperature control in guidelines and regulations to 165 reduce Legionella risks in HWDSs rely on scientific evidence and application experience, 166 the detailed implementation, especially the selection of critical control points and 167 monitoring requirements, most often reflect economic constraints. In addition, 168 significant discrepancies exist between proposed modalities of implementation and 169 management. The objectives of the present study were to: (1) demonstrate the 170 potential of detailed temperature profiling to identify areas at risk of Lp in the hot water 171 distribution systems (HWDSs) of five health care facilities (HCFs); (2) identify effective 172 monitoring strategies and guidance to conduct temperature profiling and interpretmonitoring results; (3) propose a risk characterisation approach based on temperature 174 diagnostic at critical control points. 175
MATERIALS AND METHODS 176

Hot water system characterization 177
Five hot water distribution systems (HWDSs) were analyzed. Systems 1 to 4 are smaller 178 systems within a 7-story general hospital facility of 255 beds using conventional electric 179 water heater being fed chlorinated ground water. System 5 has a larger flash system 180 feeding a ten-story 450 bed children's hospital fed by surface filtered chlorinated water. 181
A survey of the different HWDSs and connected units was first completed. 182
183
The principal flow and return loop of each system was sampled at the water heater 184 outlet, in the principal return loop and prior to the return point into the water heater. 185
The sampling ports were seldom used and were flushed prior to sampling to ensure no 186 stagnant water from the sampling port would be collected. The sampling port was 187 cleaned with ethanol and sterilized MilliQ water. Two samples were collected at each 188 point: 1) 2L in sterile polypropylene bottles with sodium thiosulfate (final concentration 189 of 1.1mg/L) microbiological analysis and 2) 250 mL for pH, temperature, chlorine and 190 conductivity measurements. Municipal water feeding the hot water systems was 191 sampled following the same protocol. In addition continuous temperature monitoring 192 was conducted on 3 subordinate return loops for system 5, using a Datalogger (RDXL4SD 193 4-Channel, Omega, Qc, Canada). treatment (pH=2; 5 min) and combination of both were performed on 3 separate 1 ml 251 aliquots. Samples were plated on GVPC selective agar (Innovation Diagnostics Inc.) and 252 incubated at 36°C for 10 days. Typical colonies that developed after 4 to 10 days were 253 sub cultured on confirmation plates for 2 to 4 days at 36°C. Resulting colonies that 254 developed on BCYE agar, but neither on blood agar nor on BCYE without cysteine were 255 considered as Legionella spp. Confirmation for Lp was conducted using the Legionella 256 latex test (DR0800, OXOID Limited). The calculated detection limit for the culture 257 method was 50 CFU/L for both Legionella spp. and L. pneumophila.
Quantification by qPCR was performed on a Corbett Rotorgene 6000 using the iQ-Check 260
Quanti L. pneumophila kit (Bio-Rad, Mississauga, Canada) with the following protocol: 261 15 min initial denaturation at 95°C followed by 50 cycles with denaturation at 95°C for 262 15 s, annealing at 57°C for 30 s, elongation at 72°C for 30s and final elongation for 15 263 min at 72°C (Bonetta et al. 2010 ). An internal control and four DNA standards ranging 264 between 19 and 3.9x10 4 genomic units (GU) were supplied with the kit. Sterilized water 265 was used as negative control. DNA extraction was performed directly on filters using a 266 bead beating method adapted from Yu and Mohn (1999). Briefly, 1L was filtered on 0.45 267 μm mixed cellulose ester and the filter was inserted into an extraction tube containing a 268 garnet matrix and one 1/4-inch ceramic sphere (Lysing Matrix A, MP Biomedicals, Solon, 269 USA). Lysing buffer was added to each tube prior to the bead beating step performed on 270 a FastPrep MPBio-24, followed by ammonium acetate precipitation and successive 271 ethanol washes. 272 273
Statistical analysis 274
Statistical analyses were performed with Statistica10 (StatSoft). A one-way analysis of 275 variance (one-way ANOVA) was used to evaluate differences between the 3 control 276 points sampled in systems 1 and 4 during the repeat sampling. A t-test was used to 277 detect differences between the two taps sampled at various stagnation times in system 278 5. Significance level was set at p = 0.05. 
RESULTS & DISCUSSION
Water heater outlet 309
Most guidelines specify that target temperatures must be maintained at all times, but 310 seldom do they specify the monitoring requirements of measurement frequency. 311
Periodic temperature readings, even daily measurements, do not provide insurance of 312 temperature maintenance in the hot water distribution system (HWDS), unless the 313 stability of the system's performance has been fully established. Systems seemingly 314 providing water above 60°C based on daily measurements can actually produce lower 315 temperature water for extended periods of time. In fact, the mean temperatures at the 316 water heater outlet for four of the five systems studied were above 60°C, but online 317 temperature monitoring revealed that production temperature was repeatedly below 318 60°C and reached down to 43°C in some cases (Table 1 and Fig. 2 ). System 1 319 consistently produced water above 60°C while systems 2, 3 and 5 regularly produced 320 water below 60°C at certain periods of the day (Fig. 2) . For system 3, temperature was 321 monitored weekly by the operators on Saturday mornings during low water demandproviding an average of 62.5°C over a period of 24 months (Table 1) . Nonetheless, when 323 online monitoring was performed during a typical weekday, mean temperature was 324 lower (57.8°C). It is also interesting to point out that even a very recently installed 325 system (2011) equipped with a flash heating unit was also subject to periodic 326 temperature drops (System 5, Fig. 2 ). These observations demonstrate the need to use 327 online monitoring to assess the temperature compliance of a HWDS compared to 328 periodic manual readings of temperature. Daily variations in hot water demand in large 329
HCFs with typical peak flow factors of ˃ 6 (Bujak 2010) can influence the temperature at 330 the water heater outlet depending on the system's capacity. The extent and duration of 331 the non-compliance of the hot water outlet temperature set point is important to 332 consider and has been limited to the sporadic short duration (minutes) events in the 333 German technical rules (Table S1) . 334 335
Return loops 336
The return loop at the point closest to the water heater is designated as the furthest 337 point from the water heater and continuous temperature monitoring is often 338 recommended (Fig. 1) . It is considered as an indicator of the system's capacity to 339 maintain temperatures throughout the hot water distribution system (HWDS). In the 340 five systems studied, the principal return loop temperatures ranged between 50.4 and 341 58.9°C with varying levels of blending from multiple return loops occurring upstream of 342 the principal return control point (Table 1) . Continuous monitoring for 2 months at the 343 return loop manifold for combined returns of units 3&5 (45.7°C), units 1&2 (48.0°C),single return for the kitchen (58.1°C) and for unit 3 prior to merging with unit 5 (46.6°C) 345 revealed wide differences compared to the overall combined return loop (53.9°C). 346
Although a regulated control location (Table S1) During low demand conditions, recirculation will dictate residence time and drive heat 361 losses. Mean system heat losses were evaluated for each of the five studied systems 362 (Table 1) . For three of the five systems, temperature losses between the water heater 363 and the principal return loop mean temperatures exceeded the target of ≤5°C set in 364 several guidelines (Table S1 ). Heat losses during circulation can be minimized by 365 reducing residence time. Water velocity can be set to meet desired maximum heat (Table S1 ). Monitoring results from the five 387
HWDSs clearly show that the selection of the return loop reference point is critical. Heatloss evaluation from the principal return loop may mask major heat losses in 389 subordinate flow and return loops, as we observed in system 5 with losses ranging from 390 3.5 to 16.3°C when evaluated for single or dual subordinate return loops (Table 1) . 391
Indeed, wide differences in temperature can occur between secondary return loops, 392
and thus all return loops should be considered individually. The overwhelming 393 importance given to temperature maintenance has also led to the specific banning of 394 recirculation shutdown in Austria and United Kingdom (Table S1 ). The nightly shutdown 395 of recirculation for energy conservation purposes is only allowed in two rules 396 (CMMQ/RBQ 2013, DVGW German Technical and Scientific Association for Gas and 397
Water 2004) and only with the demonstration of unobjectionable hygienic conditions. 398
Our results point out that the temperature losses of isolated subordinate loops during 399 stagnation resulting from such shutdowns would quickly generate durable temperature 400 conditions favorable to the growth of Lp. More importantly, such shutdowns during low 401 or nil demand conditions expose the whole HWDS, instead of a relatively small volume 402
(1,200L versus 90 to 300L in System 5) to these undesirable temperature conditions. 403 losses take place, namely the tap and its connecting piping, the secondary piping, the 407 distribution columns and/or the main feeder pipes. Profile variability for a given 408 sampling point at different times and days was found to be small, with overall profile 409 and maximum temperature reached being consistent over time despite variabletemperature in the first liter (Fig S1) . Temperature profiles obtained on the studied 411 systems are summarized in three groups (Fig. 4) , with detailed profiles presented in Fig.  412 S2. Systems 1, 2 and 3 (Fig. 4a) at recommended temperatures in order to maintain sufficient temperatures within the 417 whole system. Despite reaching equilibrium temperature rapidly (<60s), system 4 could 418 not achieve recommended temperature at the points-of-use with 57% of points never 419 reaching 55°C although all above 50°C, mainly due to the insufficient water temperature 420 at the water heater outlet (Fig. 4b) . System 5 shows a longer transition period before 421 reaching temperature equilibrium and is unable to meet 55°C for 47% and 50°C for 19% 422 of points, despite water heater and principal return loop temperatures meeting 423 recommendations (Fig. 4c) . 424
425
Additional temperature monitoring using surface thermocouples on subordinate flow 426 and return pipes were conducted on system 5 (Fig. S3) . The ongoing temperature 427 monitoring in subordinate flow and return loops in addition to the principal flow and 428 return loop provided helpful information to identify local issues. For instance, broken 429 valves in a shower faucet resulted in cold water entering the hot water feed pipe and 430 riser. Fixing the device increased the minimal temperature by an average 5°C in all 10 431 subordinate risers in this wing (Fig. S3, a-c) . A second example was insufficientrecirculation causing a significant heat loss during night flow, which was corrected by 433 the addition of a local pump on the subordinate return loop, after the furthest pair of 434 risers (Fig. S3, d-g ). These examples show the importance of characterizing local 435 conditions and the potential of single faulty devices to influence temperature 436 maintenance in large sections of hot water distribution systems (HWDS). Again, we 437 conclude that relying on temperature maintenance in the principal return loop is not 438 sufficient to identify such risk areas. 439 440
Legionella monitoring 441
Results of microbiological measurements for the five studied systems are presented in 442 with 22 and 27% positivity respectively (detection limit = 50 CFU/L; quantification limit = 446 250 CFU/L). Culture positive samples results were low, with only one count above 447 quantification limit at 600 CFU/L, located at a tap in system 5. Positivity increased above 448 80% for both systems when measured by qPCR and remained below detection limit for 449 systems 1-3, except for one sample in system 2 ( Table 1, Table S2 ). Systems in which 450 water temperature was kept consistently above 60°C coming out of the water heater 451 and maintained above 55°C across the network were below detection limit for 452
Legionella by culture or qPCR. Such results strongly suggest that satisfactory 453 management of temperature at control points in the studied systems resulted in lower 
2014). 478
A steady increase was observed in the first 12 hours of stagnation whereas longer 479 stagnation time did not lead to further increase (Lautenschlager et al. 2010 ). In the 480 present study, hot water was sampled from two taps at different stagnation times and 481
Lp concentration was evalutated by qPCR (Fig. 5b) . The taps were not found to be 482 statistically different when comparing mean results and no correlation was established 483 between the mean Lp concentration and the stagnation time. However, the stagnation 484 times were longer than 12 hours, except for the 1h stagnation and samples were taken 485 from the hot water systems. To our knowledge, there is no reported data on the impact 486 of stagnation on bacterial concentrations in hot water. These results suggest that Lp 487 concentrations in the first liter of hot water at the tap may not be affected by stagnation 488
time. 489 490
The volume of sample determines the source of the water within the HWDS. Lp 491 monitoring can be performed to assess the risk associated with 1) the water heater and 492 primary distribution network using flushed samples, and 2) the distal system, including 493 the tap and its connection to the main distribution system, using samples collected 494 concentrations to which patients may be more readily exposed. In the first volume to 505 flow from the tap, water temperature will often be lower due to previous stagnation 506 and disinfectant will be absent, favoring culturability of cells. On the other hand, higher 507 copper concentration present after prolonged stagnation could impact culturability. 508
Non-detection of Lp by culture at a given sampling point and time doesn't necessarily 509 equate to absence of risk for the system. 510
511
Volume sampled, typically 1L or more for Lp, plays an important role in data 512 interpretation, either for temperature measurements or microbiological detection 513 where the detection limit of the method improves with the use of higher volume of 514 samples. As illustrated on Fig. 1 , sampling the first liter will collect water from the tap 515 and connecting pipes, and might reach water from the subordinate return and flow 516 pipes depending on the configuration. For example, 8 meters of a 13 mm diameter pipe 517 are required to reach 1L. If a larger sample volume is required to do multiple analyses 518 (i.e. culture and qPCR or simultaneous detection of other waterborne opportunisticpathogens), it should be kept in mind that water will become less representative of the 520 point-of-use. 521 522
Value of Temperature Control in Lp Risk Management 523
The implementation of a water safety plan is the recommended approach for preventive 524 risk-management related to drinking water (WHO 2011) and temperature control is 525 widely recognized as the first risk mitigation measure for Legionella control in hot water 526 distribution systems (HWDS) ( Table S1) . 527
528
Maintaining sufficient temperatures at all critical points, including the subordinate 529 return loops, and minimizing volumes of uncontrolled temperature in the terminal ends 530 appear essential to a successful system wide thermal control of culturable and VBNC 531
Legionella. Most studies report on the results of temperature control based on 532 prevalence measured by culture-based detection methods. Although lower prevalence 533 is generally observed after temperatures are increased, limited efficacies are often 534
reported. An early study observed 50% reduction of tap positivity following an increase 535 in temperature from 45 to 60°C at the water heater outlet, although an elevated 536 number of taps located in patient rooms remained positive (Ezzeddine et al. 1989) . 537
Water temperature at the tap ranged between 30 and 56°C after a few minutes of 538 flushing, demonstrating the system's inability to provide elevated temperatures in all 539 areas. A similar reduction in % positive taps from 60-90% to 30-40% was reported in a 540 hospital when water heater temperature was raised from 50 to 65°C, in that caseproviding temperatures ˃50°C at most outlets (Blanc et al. 2005 ). Importantly, the 542 remaining positive outlets were situated in an area with inadequate recirculation. A 543 third field study documented a successful reduction of Legionella positive taps from 544 100% to a mean value of 12% maintained over 10 years following the hot water 545 temperature increase from 45 to 65°C (Darelid et al. 2002) . This temperature regimen 546 was implemented following an outbreak and resulted in water temperatures between 547 We propose a system wide risk classification to assess risk in a HWDS based on 580 published reports and our findings (Table 2 ). In addition to monitoring temperature at 581 critical control points, the evaluation criteria also include the percentage of time that 582 temperature is maintained at the hot water production unit or return loops. Indeed, 583 exposure to temperature should be considered instead of temperature alone, asloop temperatures are used to evaluate the system's heat loss within each sector of the 586 building. Temperature exposure in the subordinate flow and return loop is estimated 587 based on temperatures measured after 1 minute of flushing and serves to determine 588 risk in specific areas. When evaluating the five systems against the proposed risk 589 classification (Table 2) , results from the characterization of the HWDS combined with 590 the temperature profiles at point-of-use were good predictors of areas at risk for Lp 591 detection (Table 1 However, the rationale for frequency and number of sites for temperature monitoring is 605 not evident and the limited number of proposed control points implies that the HWDS iscause of temperature losses. To remediate this shortfall, a diagnostic flowchart for the 608 initial assessment of Legionella risk within an existing HWDS is proposed using 609 temperature measurements and profiles at the water heating unit, return loops and 610 critical points (Fig. 6) . We propose a step approach starting from the principal return 611 and flow loop system that indicates the overall system risk level, then moving 612 progressively to the subordinate flow and return loops to identify large building areas or 613 sectors at risk, and finally to the tertiary terminal ends, to identify local issues with 614 defective faucets or showers. The diagnostic flowchart also proposes a staged response 615 in terms of corrective and preventative actions, including Lp monitoring. Critical control 616 points, defined as the water heater outlet, the principal return loop and representative 617 at risk points-of-use (not reaching control temperature, farthest from the water heater 618 or serving vulnerable patients) are prioritized for sectors or systems identified at risk by 619 the initial risk assessment (Fig. 6 ). This step approach can help direct efforts towards 620 high risk areas and optimize resource allocation, especially costly Lp monitoring. 
